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Article 5

A Constitutional Challenge to Section 107 of the
Internal Revenue Code
America's founding fathers sought to avoid the discord, controversy and bloodshed which historically emanated from church-state
entanglements. 1 The first amendment to the Constitution of the
United States addressed this concern for the separation of church
and state by mandating that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof
"2

This note will examine Internal Revenue Code section 1073 to

consider whether it is an affirmative governmental act supportive of
religion which violates the establishment clause of the first amendment. Section 107(1)4 provides that the rental value of a parsonage
furnished to a minister is excludable from the minister's gross income. Section 107(2) 5 allows a minister to exclude from gross income
the amount of rental allowance that the church allocates and the
minister uses to procure a home when a parsonage is not provided.
This note first reviews the interpretation of the establishment clause
by the Supreme Court of the United States which led to the development of a three-prong test for determining whether a suspect statute
is constitutional. The established constitutional standards will then
be applied to section 107 to discern the statute's constitutionality.
I.

Establishment Clause Analysis

The establishment clause articulates a broad proscription forbidding government from enacting any law "respectirqg an establishment of religion." The Supreme Court has rejected an "absolutist"
or literal construction of the clause as hostile to religion and contrary
to the establishment clause's spirit and intent. 6 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,7
1 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947).
2 U.S. CONST. amend I. The establishment clause was applied to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

3 I.R.C. § 107 (1976).
4 I.R.C. § 107(1) (1976).
5 I.R.C. § 107(2) (1976).
6 330 U.S. at 18. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1974); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,

312 (1952).
7 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Chief Justice Burger identified the difficulties encountered in establishing standards for establishment clause analysis, noting that a law
respecting an establishment of religion may respect the forbidden objective while falling short of its total realization.8 Thus, the Chief
Justice concluded, it is not easy to identify a law respecting the establishment of religion as one that violates, the clause. 9 Chief Justice
Burger recognized that contemporary establishment clause analysis
presupposes an engineer's sense of gradation and a clairvoyant's sense
of impact.
Despite the difficulties inherent in establishment clause analysis,
the Court developed a three-pronged establishment clause test. 1°
First, a challenged statute must have a nonreligious or secular purpose." Second, the principal or primary effect of the statute must
neither advance nor inhibit religion.' 2 Third, the statute must not
3
produce an "excessive government entanglement with religion.'
Notwithstanding academic debate over its historical and philosophical purity, the three-prong test currently prevails as the standard for
4
scrutinizing a statute under the establishment clause.'
A.

The Secular Purpose Test

The first prong, the "secular legislative purpose" test, reflects the
Court's conclusion that any statute, the purpose of which is to establish, sponsor or support religion, is proscribed as establishing a religion.' 5 Purposeful governmental support of or identification with
religion is deemed an unconstitutional intrusion into an area from
which the establishment clause bars the government.
Determining secular legislative purpose involves extensive judicial discretion. The potential existence of a religiously based purpose
will not render a statute unconstitutional.' 6 A court will uphold a
challenged statute if it can find express or implied secular legislative
8 Id at 612.
9 Id
10 The three-prong test was recently reaffirmed as the Court's establishment clause standard in Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
11 See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
12 See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
13 Widmar v. Vincent; 102 S.Ct. at 275; Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 653 (1980); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 748 (1976); Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
14 Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. at 275; See generally Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the
Reh.'gion Clauses - A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1195 (1980).
15 Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
16 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961).

NOTES

[Vol. 57:653]

purpose from the statute's text or legislative history. 17 Generally, the
courts will not inquire into the hidden motives that move Congress to
exercise its constitutional power. 18
B.

The Primay Secular Efect Test

The second prong, the primary secular effect test, reaches beyond the secular legislative purpose test standards. The primary secular effect test provides that a statute violates the establishment
clause when its primary effect is to financially aid, advance, or support religion, even though the statute has a secular purpose. 19 Commentators20 agree with Justice White 21 that "prima9 , secular effect" is
a misnomer and maintain that the Couri affirmatively requires any
supportive effect to flow incidentally from statutes benefitting broad
classes of institutions or individuals. The Court, however, maintains
that government services or support provided to all citizens or broad
categories of institutions can indirectly or incidentally benefit reli22
gion without violating the establishment clause.
When applying the primary secular effect test, courts must ascertain the direct and indirect impact of a statute on a case-by-case
basis. If the statute has a valid secular purpose and it benefits a
broad class of institutions and individuals, including to some extent
religious organizations, the Supreme Court has upheld the statute's
23
constitutionality because it only incidentally impacts upon religion.
For example, the Court has sustained government programs providing reimbursement to parents of public and non-public school students for bus transportation to and from school; 24 secular textbooks
to children attending public and non-public schools; 25 diagnostic,

therapeutic and remedial services; 26 and construction of secular facil17 L. MANNING, THE LAW OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 18 (1980); Note, Tar Benefits
for the Clerp: The Unconstitutionalily ofSection 107, 62 GEO. L. J. 1261, 1266 (1974).
18 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
19 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'r., 397 U.S. 664,

674 (1970).
20 L. MANNING, supra note 17, at 145-46; L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

840 (1978).
21 Committee for Pub. Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 823 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).

22 Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 275 (1981); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 24041 (1977); Committee for Pub. Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
23

24
25
Board
26

See note 22 supra.

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).'
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v.-Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975);
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
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ities at public and non-public colleges and universities.2 7 Conversely,
where a statute has a valid secular purpose that benefits only a limited class of primarily religious institutions or individuals, the
Supreme Court has found the statute unconstitutional because the
statute's primary effect was to advance religion.2 8 This issue arises
frequently in government programs designed to aid non-public
schools, which are primarily religious affiliates. The Court has struck
down programs allowing religious instruction in public schools; 29 tax
credits to parents of children attending non-public schools; 30 salary
supplements for non-public school teachers; 31 funds for maintaining
and repairing non-public school buildings; 3 2 general instructional
material and equipment; 33 and funds for non-public school teacher
supervised field trips. 34 The Court will probably continue its caseby-case determination of primary secular effect, relying heavily on
the categories delineated in its previous rulings.
The breadth of a statute's benefitted class is important in determining primary secular effect. However, statutes which benefit all
religions equally are not sustainable under the establishment
clause.3 5 In Everson v. Board of Education,36 Justice Black articulated
the Court's interpretation that:
[t]he 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
. . . can pass laws which aid
37
one religion over another.

However, disagreement exists over whether the establishment clause
was originally intended to prohibit aid to all religions. Some scholars
maintain that the establishment clause originally sought only to prohibit the designation or support of a particular state church. 38 The
27 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
28 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
29 McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
30 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
31 Id
32 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 377 (1975).
33 Id at 362-63.
34 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
35 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973); McCollum v. Board
of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
36 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
37 Id at 15. It is noteworthy that-the dissenting Justices in Everson agreed with Justice
Black's construction. Id at 26-28, 41, 52-53, 60. Subsequent Court opinions have maintained
that the Court's opinion on this matter is "firmly established." Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
38

See C. ANTINEAU, A. DOWNEY, & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISH-
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Court's contemporary interpretation of the establishment clause's
scope may have exceeded the scope originally envisioned by the
founding fathers.3 9 Given the Court's current definitive stance, however, the disagreement regarding the establishment clause's proper
scope has only parenthetical significance.
C.

The Excessive Entanglement Test

The third prong, the excessive entanglement test, demonstrates
the Supreme Court's belief that the establishment clause erects a constitutional wall, relegating church and state to respective spheres each unencumbered by the other's functioning. 4° The purpose of disentanglement is to protect against the mutually corrupting influences4 1 which the separate spheres have historically experienced
when entanglement has occurred. 42 Admittedly, an absolute wall is
impossible. 43 Government must accommodate religion in those areas
where interaction is inevitable. 44 Consequently, the Court has repeatedly, recognized that excessive entanglement is a matter of
degree. 45
The Court has identified two types of statutes that are clearly
prone to excessive entanglement challenges. The first type includes
statutes the implementation of which requires significant administrative entanglement; the second type includes statutes intruding into
46
areas fraught with actual or potential political divisiveness.
The leading case dealing with administrative entanglement is
Lemon v. Kurtzman.47 In Lemon, the Supreme Court struck down New
York and Rhode Island statutes governing state programs which proMENT 1-29 (1964); Corwin, The Supreme Court as a NationalSchool Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3, 20 (1949).
39 See L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 816-19.
40 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977).
41 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 649 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
42 Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 673, 675 (1970); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 614 (1971).
43 Id at 614, 628-29 (Douglas, J., concurring), 646-47 (Brennan, J., concurring); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
44 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
45 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664, 67476 (1970).
46 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-24 (1971).
47 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979),
the Court interpreted the National Labor Relations Act to avoid excessive entanglement.

The Court ruled that Congress did not intend that lay teachers at church-operated schools be
covered by the National Labor Relations Act. The Court noted that "[i]nevitably the Board's
inquiry will implicate sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts between clergy-administrators and the Board, or conflicts with negotiators for unions." Id at 503. While the decision
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vided certain educational financial aid, because the primary beneficiaries were parochial schools. The Court reasoned that it must
examine the type of institutions benefitted, the nature of the stateprovided aid, and the result of the relationship between the government and religious authority before it can determine whether there
has been excessive entanglement. 48 The Court concluded that administration of these state aid programs would foster a dangerous
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance
")49

Politically divisive entanglement is "[a] broader base of entanglement" 50 objectionable because unnecessary government intrusion
into certain highly charged areas has the potential of politically polarizing the public along religious lines. 51 In Lemon, the Court emphasized that state aid to parochial schools was an area of
governmental action historically and prospectively capable of creating unnecessary political strife.5 2 The Court in Lemon indicated that
a statute's history of controversy is persuasive in political divisiveness
analysis. 53 In Meek v. Pitlinger,5 4 the Court explained that programs
primarily benefitting church-related schools are potentially politically divisive in their requirements of continuing annual appropria55
tions and subjective determinations of need.
The Court has recognized that entanglement analysis necessarily overlaps with an analysis of secular legislative purpose and primary effect. 56 Excessive entanglement is meant, however, to provide
an independent analytic hurdle once the other two tests have been
cleared. 57 The inverted gradational analysis articulated in Waz v.
Tax Commissioner provides an added dimension of complexity. 58 In
merely restricts administrative action, it does display the Court's reluctance to permit the
development of grounds upon which the church and state may clash.
48 403 U.S. at 615.
49 Id at 619.
50 Id at 622.
51 One commentator noted that while the Supreme Court has never invalidated a law
solely because such a potential was present, it has often noted such potential and acknowledged that the risk of political divisiveness along sectarian lines has figured in a judgment of
unconstitutionality. L. TRIBE, supra note 20 at 868.
52 403 U.S. at 622-24.
53 Id. at 623. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'r., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970); id. at 681 (Brennan, J., concurring).
54 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
55 Id at 372.
56 Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973).
57 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
58 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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Waz, the Court addressed a New York statute that provided a property tax exemption to religious organizations. Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the Court, emphasized that both taxing and exempting
property owned by religious organizations involved a certain amount
of entanglement. 59 However, in finding the property tax exemption
constitutional, the Court noted that providing a property tax exemption reduced the degree of entanglement that would otherwise result
from taxing religious organizations' property. 60 Admittedly, some
entanglement remained in that "the state had a. continuing burden
to ascertain that exempt property was in fact being used for religious
worship.1 61 Upon balancing the degree of entanglement involved
against the alternatives, however, the Court decided that an exemption should be granted.
II.

Section 107

Internal Revenue Code section 107 permits ministers to exempt
from gross income either the rental value of a parsonage or a rental
allowance provided to obtain housing. 62 Section 107(1) provides that
"[i]n the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not include - (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his
-63
compensation ....
The phrase "[m]inister of the gospel," which applies to both sections 107(1) and 107(2), has been interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to include clergy of all faiths.64 Cases and IRS
rulings ostensibly limit section 107 to "duly ordained, commissioned
or licensed clergy."'65 However, the cases and rulings do not necessar66
ily disqualify self-styled or self-appointed ministers.
In addition, the minister of the gospel must receive the remuneration "as part of his compensation. '67 The IRS has construed this
59 Id at 674. The Court noted that the end result - the effect - must not be an excessive
entanglement with religion, the test being one of degree. The Court admitted that either
taxation or exemption of churches occasions some degree of involvement with religion. Id
60 Id at 674-76.
61 Id In Lemon, Chief Justice Burger referred to Waz, stating that under the statutory
exemption before the Court in Wa~z, the state had a continuing burden to ascertain that
exempt property was actually being used for religious worship. 403 U.S. at 614.
62 I.R.C. § 107 (1976).
63 I.R.C. § 107(1) (1976).
64 Abraham A. Salkov, 46 T.C. 190 (1966); Rev. Rul. 58-221, 1968-1 C.B. 53.
65 Kirk v. Comm'r., 425 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Rev.
Rul. 66-90, 1966-1 C.B. 27; Rev. Rul. 65-124, 1965-1 C.B. 44; Rev. Rul. 57-522, 1957-2 C.B.

50.
66
67

P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1961).
I.R.C. § 107 (1976).
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provision to mean "remuneration for services which are ordinarily
the duties of a minister of the gospel." 68 The regulations interpret
qualified duties to include performing sacredotal functions, conducting religious worship, administering religious organizations, and
teaching at theological seminaries. 69 The IRS has also ruled that a
retired clergy member may exclude as compensation for past services
70
the rental value of a parsonage furnished to him.
Section 107(2) provides that "[i]n the case of a minister of the
gospel, gross income does not include - (2) the rental allowance paid
to him as part of his compensation, to the extent used by him to rent
'71
or provide a home.
Applying section 107(2) is more complex than applying section
107(1) because section 107(2) exempts a "rental allowance" received,
72
provided that the amount is designated as such by the church,
rather than only in kind provision of housing. 73 Section 107(2) fur74
ther limits the excludable rental allowance to the amount used.
Thus, exemption under section 107(2) may require an examination
of a minister's records.7 5 In determining the extent to which the
rental allowance is used, the IRS has complicated matters by ruling
that a minister who purchases rather than rents a home may exclude
76
the home's fair rental value from gross income.
III.

Establishment Clause Analysis of Section 107

Many legal scholars might reason that section 107's use of a religiously based classification renders the statute unconstitutional as
violating the establishment clause. Professor Kurland 77 maintains
that the religion clauses "must be read to mean that religion may not
be used as a basis of classification for purposes of government action,
whether that action be the conferring of rights or privileges or the
68
69
70
71

Treas Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (1958).
Id
Rev. Rul. 63-156, 1963-2 C.B. 79.
I.R.C. § 107(2) (1976).

72

Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(b) (1951).

See Richard Eden, 41 T.C. 605, 607 (1964);

Rev.

Rul. 72-462, 1972-2 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul 59-350, 1959-2 C.B. 45.
73 The IRS will scrutinize proffered resolutions, minutes, budgets, employment contracts
or other indicia to discern church designation of rental allowance. Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(b)
(1957).
74 I.R.C. § 107(2) (1976).
75 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(b) (1957).
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (1963).
77 Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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imposition of duties or obligations. '78 Section 107 classifies recipients
of government benefits on the basis of religion; thus, the statute must
be scrutinized under the establishment clause.
Section 107 is divided into two subsections, 107(1) and 107(2),
each having a distinct legislative history, intent, and impact. Consequently, this note will treat each subsection separately.
A.

Section 107(1): Rental Value

The constitutionality of section 107(1) depends upon its compliance with the Supreme Court's three-prong establishment clause test.
79
Section 107(1) does not overtly express a secular legislative purpose.
Nor does the legislative history of section 107(1), enacted in 1921,
buttress or imply a secular legislative intent. 80 Absent a demonstrable secular legislative purpose the courts must hypothecate a reasonable secular legislative purpose if section 107(1) is to stand.
The courts have accepted the separation of church and state as a
tenable secular purpose.8 1 Historically, church property in America
has been exempt from state property taxation. 82 Congress may have
reasoned that taxing a parsonage's value improperly entangles
church property in government regulation. Indeed, it appears contradictory to exempt church property from state property taxation
on separation grounds while allowing the federal government to tax
the same church property's value to ministers.
The second prong of the establishment clause test requires a sustainable enactment to manifest a primary secular effect. The determination of a primary secular effect requires a catalog of all effects
incident to section 107(1)'s enactment. The most direct effect of section 107(1) is the conferral of a substantial financial benefit on ministers in the form of a tax exemption.8 3 However, section 107(1) also
78 P. KURLAND, supra note 66, at 18.
79 Section 107(1) has descended substantially intact from its genesis as section 213(b) (1 1)
of the Revenue Act of 1921. The Committee and Conference Reports for the Revenue Act of
1921 do not mention section 213(b)(1 1). See Internal Revenue Hearings on the ProposedRevenue Act
of 1921 Before the Senate Committee on Fzance, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 497-577 (1921); S. REP. No.
257, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921); H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
80 See note 79 supra.
81 Walz v. Tax Comm'r., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
82 Id at 676.
83 Section 107(1) effects a tax treatment deferential to ministers. Section 107(1) can be
roughly analogized to Internal Revenue Code section 119. Section 119 allows any employee
to exclude from gross income the value of lodging furnished on the employer's premises, for
the convenience of the employer, and as a condition of employment. The requirements for
exemption under section 119 are more stringent than the blanket exemption granted by section 107(1). However, if section 107(1) did not exist, ministers could still claim that their
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confers significant indirect benefits to religious organizations.
Churches benefit from section 107(1) by being able to pay ministers lower salaries, commensurate with the tax savings. Thus, section
107(1) confers a benefit similar to a cash grant subsidy on churches.
In Committeefor Public Education v. Nyquz'st,84 the Court recognized that
a tax deduction is a means of support for establishment clause
purposes.8 5
Not only does section 107(1) confer a benefit on religious institutions and individuals, but it places a corresponding burden on the
taxpayer to the extent that the taxpayer's weighted tax burden is
increased by the amount of the section 107(1) exemption.
Section 107(1) can be construed as effecting a separation of
86
church and state analogous to that in Wa/z v. Tax Commissioner.
Walz emphasized that potential grounds of confrontation between
church and state are to be avoided.8 7 Section 107(1) is consistent
with the avoidance principle set forth in Walz because it eliminates a
parsonage's rental value from assessment and conflict. Many parsonages are physically attached to churches. Absent section 107(1), a
church would have to segregate the value of church land, buildings,
and unitary services such as heating, plumbing, and electricity to determine rental value. Disputes over assessment would inevitably
arise. Confrontations would require the production and inspection
of a church's, not a minister's, bills, documents, and deeds. In Wa/z,
the Court upheld real estate tax exemptions to avoid excessive entanglement. 88 If the courts overrule section 107(1)'s exemption, the
same areas of confrontation protected in Walz would be'exposed.
Wa/z's "excessive entanglement" analysis generates a secular
legislative purpose that the courts could hypothecate to justify section 107(1). In Wa/z, the Court ruled that the indirect support of
religion that a property tax exemption provides is only incidental to
designing a fiscal relationship with minimal church-state entanglement. 89 The Supreme Court could apply the Walz rationale to hylodging, furnished on the employer's premises, for the convenience of the employer, and as a
condition of employment should be exempt under the provisions of section 119. The disparate tax treatment effected by section 107(1) arguably stems from the difficulty of qualification rather than the type of benefit provided. See I.R.C. § 119 (1976).
84 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
85 Id at 785-91.

86

397 U.S. 664 (1970).

87 Id at 674. The potential grounds for confrontation in Walz included tax assessments
and property valuations which are required for computation of a property tax. Id
88 Id
89 Id at 676.
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pothecate a secular legislative purpose for 107(1) as insulating church
owned property from excessive government entanglement.
The breadth or narrowness of the class of section 107
beneficiares is irrelevant under the Walz disentanglement analysis.
The Court has indicated that a narrow class of beneficiaries implies a
special aid to religion under secular purpose90 and primary secular
effect analyses. 9' The Court has further indicated that the narrowness of a statute's class of beneficiaries is an important factor in politically divisive entanglement analysis. 92 The analytic inquiry in
disentanglement is separation, however, not support or foundations
of political discord. Whether a statute furthering separation exists
alone or as a part of a wider exemption has no qualitative effect on
the degree of separation a statute effects.
The third prong of the establishment clause test requires an
analysis of the entanglement inherent in section 107(1)'s application.
Section 107(1) involves an administrative entanglement to the extent
that an individual must establish his or her status as a minister performing ministerial duties. 93 The entanglement inherent in section
107(1) seems no more excessive than the entanglement sustained in
the Waz case of ascertaining that religiously exempt property is being used for religious worship. 94 The section 107(1) exemption resembles the exemption in Walz in that the elimination of section
107(1) would increase rather than diminish the degree of government
entanglement.
Section 107(1) does not entrench upon an area likely to stoke the
fires of religiously based discord. Section 107(1) does not require a
government appropriation or determination of need. Section
107(1)'s low profile existence since 1921 indicates that it is not the
type of politically divisive measure that the Court will find
objectionable.
B.

Section 107(2): Rental Allowance

The constitutionality of section 107(2) also depends upon its
compliance with the Supreme Court's three-prong establishment
clause test. The first prong mandates that section 107(2) evince a
secular legislative purpose. No express secular legislative intent is
90
91

Id at 672-73.
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 823 (1973).

.92 Id at 794.
93 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1976).
94 See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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discernable from section 107(2). 9 5 Section 107(2) amended the parsonage exclusion in 1954. The conference report for section 107(2)
states that the exclusion of the rental value of a home furnished a
minister as part of his salary was unfair to those ministers who must
receive larger salaries (which are taxable) to compensate them for
their expenses in supplying a home. 96 Section 107(2)'s author indicates that section 107(2) was penned to aid underpaid clergy members. 9 7 The provision's legislative history portrays it as a countermeasure to the financial benefit that section 107(1) grants to
churches having parsonages.
Hypothecating an independent secular legislative purpose for
section 107(2) is difficult. Section 107(2) does not separate church
property from government regulation. Nor does section 107(2) only
incidentally impact religion while promoting or preserving broad
public objectives such as health, safety or commerce. Therefore, section 107(2) fails to pass constitutional muster under the first prong of
the test.
The second prong of the establishment clause test requires section 107(2) to manifest a primarily secular effect. Section 107(2) directly benefits ministers and religion. The most direct effect of
section 107(2) is its significant lowering of a minister's tax burden.
Section 107(2) concurrently bestows an economic benefit upon the
minister's church, in much the same manner as section 107(1).98
While the support section 107(2) provides to ministers and religions is
qualitatively identical to section 107(1), there is one difference. The
IRS has interpreted section 107(2) to allow ministers who purchase
homes to exclude the home's fair rental value from gross income. 99
Section 107(2) thus provides ministers with personal benefits beyond
any religious considerations by allowing an exemption for funds expended on a home which will appreciate in value.
One cannot perceive section 107(2)'s aggregate benefits as flow95 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954); H. R. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
96 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
97 Section 107(2)'s author, Congressman Peter Mack, argued that clergy members were
statistically underpaid fighters of godlessness who deserved the congressional support inherent
in section 107(2). Hearingson GeneralRevenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
83rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1575-76 (1953).
98 The aid granted by section 107(2) parallels the benefits generated by section 107(1).
Section 107(2) allows a church to pay lower salaries and still provide their ministers with a
given net income. The taxpayer supports the minister and religion because the taxpayer's
weighted tax burden is increased by the amount of the deduction.
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(c) (1963).
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ing from a Walz type separation of church and state. Section 107(2)
confers its entitlements based exclusively on a minister's religious status. The courts are not likely to ignore the religious support that
section 107(2) effects and rule that section 107(2) has the primary
effect of establishing equity among the Code's benefits. 10 0 In Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,' ° ' the Court reviewed a New York
statute governing a tax deduction program. The statute sought to
achieve tax parity for parents who supported public schools while
being religiously compelled to send their children to parochial
schools. The Court struck down the New York statute stating:
Special tax benefits, however, cannot be squared with the principle of
neutrality established by the decisions of this Court. To the contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who send
and inevitable efct are
their children to sectarian schools, theirpurpose
02
to aid and advance those religious institutions.'
Absent a Walz disentanglement justification, section 107(2) should be
construed as violating the establishment clause.
A primary non-secular effect of section 107(2) cannot be justified
under the guise of tax equity. In Sloan v. Lemon,' 0 3 the Court indicated that an equity claim under the equal protection clause cannot
sustain a program that violates the establishment clause. In Sloan,
the parents of children attending sectarian schools argued that they
were entitled to receive the same assistance as parents of those children attending non-sectarian schools as a matter of equal protection.
The Court stated in Sloan that:
The Equal Protection Clause has never been regarded as a bludgeon with which to compel a state to violate other provisions of the
Constitution. Having held that tuition reimbursements for the
benefit of sectarian schools violate the Establishment Clause, nothing in the04 Equal Protection Clause will suffice to revive that
program. '
Thus, an argument that section 107(2) promotes tax equity should
fail.
Section 107(2) may unconstitutionally prefer certain religions
100 That some churches have parsonages and benefit by section 107(1), while others do
not, seems no more of a burning injustice than the fact that certain employers could provide
"in kind" tax exempt housing under section 119 but do not. Se text accompanying note 82
upra.
"
101
102
103
104

413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Id at 793 (emphasis added).
413 U.S. 825 (1972).
Id at 834.

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[June 1982]

over others. For example, a congregational religion with no permanent or specifically designated ministers would not receive section
107(2)'s financial benefits as would a centralized religion with a designated ministry. Professor Tribe, 10 5 while not specifically referring
to section 107(2), questions the constitutionality of narrow exemption
statutes. He reasons that a religious exemption granted to less than
all whose views could arguably be deemed religious might support a
claim that the government is helping to establish religion by its cir10 6
cumscribed exemption.
Applying section 107(2) does not involve excessive entanglement. The parties to a section 107(2) administrative conflict are limited primarily to the government and an individual minister, not a
church. Reviewing a minister's employment contract or a church
resolution is certainly no more involved than determining that exempt property is being used for religious worship. Nor has section
107(2) developed into a politically divisive enactment requiring renunciation to prevent political polarization along religious lines.
IV.

Conclusion

The establishment clause prohibits governmental acts in support
of religion. In general, code section 107 authorizes governmental acts
in support of religion in the form of a narrow exemption that directly
and indirectly benefits religious institutions and individuals.
Establishment clause analysis reveals that section 107(1) possesses a constitutionally sustainable purpose and effect on disentanglement grounds. Walz stands for the proposition that the
government should keep its administrative hands off of church property. Entanglement leads to conflict. Section 107(1) has separated
church property from government entanglement since 1921 and
should be sustained.
Section 107(2), however, fails the establishment clause test. Section 107(2)'s enactment in 1954 was a governmental attempt to
equalize the section 107(1) tax benefits for churches without parsonages. It is not the proper role of government to equalize financial
benefits among differently situated churches. Rather, any governmental aid to religion must incidentally derive from an act with a
105
106

Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Law, Harvard University.
See L. TRIBE, supra note 20, at 840.

[Vol. 57:653]

867

NOTES

secular legislative purpose and a primary secular effect. Since section
107(2) fails this test, it should be struck down as violating the establishment clause.
Thomas E. O'Neill

